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Models in which causation arises from higher level structures as well as from microdynamics may
be relevant to unifying quantum theory with classical physics or general relativity. They also give a
way of defining a form of panprotopsychist property dualism, in which consciousness and material
physics causally affect one another. I describe toy models based on probabilistic cellular automata
that illustrate possibilities and difficulties with these ideas.
INTRODUCTION
The reductionist paradigm for theoretical physics suggests that the properties of complex structures, including their
dynamics, can be understood as a consequence of those of their elementary components. It is not easy to characterise
precisely what this means in all cases. Is a space-time or the vacuum state of a quantum field a complex structure,
for example? And if so, what are their elementary components? Is a bare quark an elementary component or a
mathematical fiction? Is quantum entanglement a counter-example to reductionism or just an illustration that the
concept needs to be framed more carefully?
Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that some appropriately nuanced and qualified version of reductionism has been
extremely successful, so much so that many theorists seek unified theories in which all of physics is characterised by
some theory of the initial conditions together with relatively simple (though, in one way or another, probabilistic)
dynamical laws.
Although the boundaries of reductionism may be slightly fuzzy, we can certainly produce models or theories that are
clearly beyond them and unambiguously anti-reductionist. One example would be a theory that predicts qualitatively
different dynamical equations for different types of molecule.[18] Another would be a vitalist theory that predicts that
living creatures disobey some conservation law of classical mechanics. The general consensus is that we should assign
low priors to such theories, not only because reductionism has been successful, but also because reductionist theories
tend to be more elegant, and aligning credence with elegance has also been a very successful scientific methodology.
Still, anti-reductionist models in which higher and lower level structures both play fundamental roles seem worth
investigating. Trying to unify quantum theory and gravity, or even quantum theory and classical physics, raises
unsolved conceptual and technical problems. It is hard even to begin to understand scientifically the relationship
between consciousness and matter. Perhaps reductionist unification will ultimately plough through all these obstacles
but, so long as it hasn’t, it is worth asking whether other ideas could possibly be relevant.
This paper explores some toy models, inspired by cellular automata, which illustrate possible ways in which higher
level structures act causally on the microscopic components, as well as vice versa. They give one possible framework
for discussions about the possible explanatory power of top down causation in fundamental science.
CELLULAR AUTOMATON 110
Wolfram [1, 2] classified the 256 elementary one dimensional cellular automata. These are defined by binary states
with a time step rule in which the states of cell n at time t are determined by those of cells n − 1, n, n + 1 at time
(t − 1). He noted the particularly interesting and complex behaviour of the automaton defined by rule 110 in his
classification. This is defined by
FIG. 1: The rule 110 cellular automaton. The states of cells n − 1, n, n + 1 at time (t − 1), given on the first row, determine
that of cell n at time t, given on the second row.
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2FIG. 2: The ether.
FIG. 3: Gliders.
Wolfram had previously suggested [3] that rule 110 is Turing complete, a result subsequently proved by Cook [4];
another discussion of the result is given in Ref. [2]. We review here some of its known properties, using results and
images generated by Wolfram Mathematica and resources [5] from the Wolfram Data Repository, which helpfully
includes routines that reproduce many interesting diagrams originally given in Ref. [2].
The rule generates a regular repeating array with period 14, known as the “ether”: We will take this to be the
analogue of a “vacuum” or “background state” in the toy models defined below.
Some finite dislocations in the lattice-like 1D structure of a row of the ether can propagate regularly. These so-called
“gliders” generate quasi-particle-like tracks in the ether. Cook [4] classified a variety of rule 110 gliders, including
some infinite classes: Colliding gliders undergo “interactions” reminiscent of Feynman diagrams, typically producing
a finite number of stable new gliders after a finite interaction time:
We can define a very simple model of errors or noise in these structures by considering the possibility of a single
bit flip on the first row. One might motivate this by supposing that there is something particular about the system
FIG. 4: Interactions.
3FIG. 5: Perturbing the ether at a point distant from a glider.
FIG. 6: Perturbing the ether at a point close to a glider.
at t = 0 that makes errors or noise possible on the first row, and only that row,[19] with error probability low enough
that we can neglect the possibility of two or more errors arising
If we consider a glider propagating in the ether, with a single bit of the initial state flipped at a site in the ether
that is far from the glider, the effect tends to be simply to cause some ripples in the ether that propagate for some
time and then peter out without interacting with the glider. The glider’s propagation is thus unaffected, as Fig. 5
illustrates.
However, if we flip a bit close to a glider, it can interact in a way that permanently alters the number and type of
gliders. Fig. 6 shows the same glider states with one initial bit flipped. Only the second is asymptotically unaffected.
Perturbations affect interacting gliders similarly. A perturbation distant from interacting gliders generally peters
out without affecting them. However, perturbations in the vicinity of one or more interacting gliders may alter the
types and/or number of gliders in the final or asymptotic state.
Fig. 7 shows a pair of interacting gliders with a single flipped bit, whose site runs sequentially through 21 sites
initially located between the gliders. Of these perturbations, the 1st, 4th, 12th, 13th, 15th and 18th leave the final
glider states, highlighted, are asymptotically unchanged. The 5th, 9th and 17th, highlighted in Fig. 8, all produce
the same new asymptotic final state, consisting of a single glider.
PROBABILISTIC AUTOMATA AND TOP-DOWN CAUSATION
A simple probabilistic model
We can formalise the model above as a 1D cellular automaton whose states are defined on sites labelled by the
integers, at times also labelled by the integers. When the error probability p is zero, it is a deterministic type 110
automaton. The ether, or the ether with a single glider, then propagate indefinitely without perturbation. A pair of
gliders may approach one another from infinity, interact, and produce some number of outgoing gliders, which then
propagate indefinitely.
We may also take the model to have finitely many spatial sites, with periodic boundary conditions. In this case,
with appropriate numbers of sites, the ether and a single glider state may still propagate indefinitely. If a pair of
4FIG. 7: Perturbations near interacting gliders. The highlighted examples leave the final states asymptotically unchanged.
FIG. 8: Perturbations near interacting gliders. The highlighted examples produce the same asymptotic final state, a single
glider.
gliders with different velocities are evident during some time interval, they will, so to speak, interact in both the past
and future. If the interaction products contain two or more gliders with different velocities, they in turn will interact,
and the asymptotic behaviour may be quite complex. We can avoid this by defining the model only for a finite time
interval, short compared to N/v, where N is the number of sites and v the maximum glider speed.
We suppose that there is some probability p > 0 of an error occurring on the row of sites at t = 0. An error flips
the bit value of a single site, so that it takes the opposite value to that predicted by the deterministic dynamics from
the state at t = −1. To simplify, we suppose that there is no probability of more than one error, and that errors are
restricted to sites x, where −M ≤ x ≤ M , where (2M + 1) ≤ N if there are finitely many (N) sites. The errors in
this region have uniform probability, so that each site in the region has error probability p2M+1 .
5The discussion of the previous section then applies: errors sufficiently far from any gliders at t = 0 will typically
peter out before interacting and have no effect on the final or asymptotic late time glider states; errors close to gliders
can alter the number and type of final or asymptotic late time gliders.
Incorporating top down causation
We now consider modifying the dynamics by assigning probability weight factors to final glider states conditional
on initial glider states.
One simple rule is to assign probability weight factor 1 to final states are that the same as the initial state for single
glider propagation and two glider interactions, and weight factor 0 to distinct states. Formally,
pmod(Gf |Gi) = Cw(Gf |Gi)p(Gf |Gi) , (1)
pmod(G
1
f , G
2
f , . . . , G
n
f |Gi) = 0 for n 6= 1 , (2)
pmod(G
1
f , G
2
f |G1i , G2i ) = C ′w(G1f , G2f |G1i , G2i )p(G1f , G2f |G1i , G2i ) , (3)
pmod(G
1
f , G
2
f , . . . , G
n
f |G1i , G2i ) = 0 for n 6= 2 . (4)
Here
w(Gf |Gi) = δGf ,Gi . (5)
Multiple glider states are listed from left to right and so
w(G1f , G
2
f |G1i , G2i ) = δG1f ,G2i δG2f ,G1i (6)
for colliding gliders, while
w(G1f , G
2
f |G1i , G2i ) = δG1f ,G1i δG2f ,G2i (7)
for gliders that never collide. The expression p(Gf |Gi) is the probability of the final state containing (only) the
single glider Gf when the initial state contains glider Gi in the model of the last subsection; p(G
1
f , G
2
f |G1i , G2i ) is the
probability of the final state containing (precisely) the pair G1f , G
2
f when the initial state contains the pair G
1
i , G
2
i ;
C and C ′ are rescaling factors chosen so that the probabilities of all possible final states sum to 1 for a given initial
state.
This rule is understood as applying to the system as a whole. It does not alter the deterministic dynamics of rule
110, and so its effect is to alter the probabilities of errors in the state at t = 0, which are the only probabilistic feature
of the toy model. For example, for an initial state containing a single glider G, it slightly increases the probability
of errors at sites (such as those far from the glider) where they do not affect the glider propagation, increases the
probability of no error, and eliminates the possibility of errors occurring at sites where they would alter the asymptotic
glider propagation. It has similar effects for initial states containing two gliders G and G′. Effectively, the rule acts
to suppress errors in glider propagation, ensuring the stability of one and two glider states, which would otherwise be
menaced by possible errors in the microdynamics.
A variation is to assign probability weight 1 to specified final state outcomes of two glider interactions, and 0
otherwise, while retaining the weights above for single glider states Thus
w(Gf |Gi) = δGf ,Gi (8)
as above but w(G1f , G
2
f , . . . , G
n
f |G1i , G2i ) may have a more general form. For example, we might take w(Gf |G1i , G2i ) = 1
for some specified final state Gf , and zero for all other final states. This ensures that initial glider states G
1
i , G
2
i always
produce final state Gf . however small the unmodified probability of this outcome is, so long as it is nonzero.
Compatibility with standard temporal and Minkowski causation
Framed as above, these modified toy models may appear to involve something like instantaneous action at a distance,
since the probability of error at a given site at t = 0 effectively depends on the type and number of gliders at distant
sites at the same time. If we think of the models as capturing the behaviour of particles (modelled by gliders)
6propagating in a background (the ether) with stochastic fluctuations (the errors), in some non-relativistic limit of a
theory in relativistic space-time, this may seem to involve retrocausation: the probability of an error at a site depends
on the final glider states in regions in its causal future.
While the models certainly could represent features of theories with non-standard causation, they are compatible
with standard causation, even for relativistic theories. We can take the relevant glider speeds to be below light speed
in such theories. The gliders contained in the state at t = 0 depend deterministically on those contained in the states
at t < 0. We can thus equally well understand the probability of error of any site at t = 0 as determined by the glider
states at suitably large negative t, when the gliders are within the site’s past light cone. Interpreted in this way, errors
at t = 0 are causally determined by glider states at large negative t, according to laws that ensure specific glider
states at large positive t. For example, one might imagine the models as capturing essential features of some deeper
theory in which this causal determination is made more explicit, by degrees of freedom that carry information away
non-superluminally from negative time glider states to sites throughout the ether and influence the error probabilities
at t = 0 appropriately.
DISCUSSION
Quantum theory, gravity and classical physics
As these toy models illustrate, probabilistic theories of microdynamics can be simply modified so that structures
at two or more levels play roles in the fundamental laws. This makes it easy to build and explore models with top
down causation. Such models could be relevant to unifying quantum theory and gravity. For example, one could
imagine space-time emerging from a fundamentally quantum theory, within a theory in which it is equipped with
its own independent dynamical laws; in such a theory, both space-time and its quantum constituents would causally
affect one another, with neither reducible to the other. The same type of relationship is possible between classical
and quantum degrees of freedom within a fixed background space-time. Classical physics is normally thought of as
emerging from and reducible to quantum theory (by Everettians) or some extension of quantum theory (by non-
Everettians who believe some extension is needed to resolve the measurement problem). The latter looks plausible
(e.g. [6, 7]) and the simplest possibility, but it is interesting to ask how strongly empirical evidence constrains more
general theories [7–9].
There are also reasons to consider physical models of consciousness that feature top down causation. There are
evidently physical correlates of consciousness, namely human brains. If there is a fundamental physical law associating
conscious states to physical systems, it seems unlikely that it associates consciousness to brains and to nothing simpler:
brains seem too complex as physical systems to be the elementary referents of such a law. Full-blown panpsychism,
in which every elementary particle has an associated elementary consciousness, is a possible alternative, but comes
with many problems [10, 11] and does not seem to fit naturally with neuroscientific data and our conscious self-
observations or those reported by others. The intermediate option of panprotopsychism [12], according to which
elementary consciousness is associated with some physical systems (whose nature remains to be specified) larger
than elementary particles and smaller than brains, shares some of the problems of panpsychism, but allows more
possibilities that might fit with empirical observation.
Panprotopsychist models of consciousness
Our probabilistic cellular automata can be taken as toy models of interactionist panprotopsychism. In these toy
models, the elementary bits at each site are meant to correspond to elementary components, and the deterministic
dynamics of rule 110 and unmodified error probability rules correspond to the elementary microdynamics. The
gliders represent physical systems associated with elements of consciousness, which we might take to be quales or
(if we stretch the present models even more unrealistically in order to illustrate how the idea might be extended)
thoughts that we can represent by a sentence such as “I see blue”. The first modified versions of the model, in
which the error probabilities are redefined to ensure that single gliders and pairs of gliders propagate unaffected
by errors, then correspond to toy models in which panprotopsychist consciousness ensures error suppression at the
level of consciousness, in the sense that quales (or thoughts) propagate unaffected in the substrate, despite errors
in the microdynamics. The second modified versions redefine the error probabilities to ensure that pairs of gliders
produce specified outcomes that would not arise in the absence of errors. These correspond to toy models in which
7panprotopsychist consciousness is equipped with its own dynamics, which overrides the dynamics of the substrate
when the two conflict.
An argument in favour of something like this picture is that, if particular physical structures are indeed singled
out as having an elementary proto-consciousness by fundamental physical laws, it is arguably natural that these
physical structures should also feature in the fundamental dynamical laws. One might even speculate that nature has
probabilistic laws because of the need to combine dual causalities, of matter and mind.
It is helpful to compare the pros and cons of this line of thought with those of a similarly panprotopsychist form
of epiphenomenalism. This would associate consciousness in a lawlike way to specified physical structures, without
modifying the microdynamics. The problem with this and other types of epiphenomenalism, as William James first
pointed out [13], is that they leave all the apparently evolutionarily adaptive properties of consciousness unexplained.
If physical laws of consciousness do not affect the microdynamics, then we and other creatures would function equally
well if we were unconscious zombies, or if pleasure and pain were uncorrelated with evolutionary advantage, or if
our consciousnesses were focussed on information that had no relevance to our survival or well-being, or if we had
“locked-in” consciousnesses disconnected from any of our communications. On this view, we have to accept that
not only the existence of consciousness, but the apparent fine-tuning of its specific features, are just astonishingly
convenient coincidences.
In contrast, there is scope for more convincing explanations of the evolution of consciousness and of some of its
features if dynamics give it a genuinely causal role in behaviour. It seems plausible, for example, that effectively
coupling two types of dynamical rule allows evolution to more easily produce stimulus-response circuits that are more
stable or follow higher-level reasoning. It also seems plausible that evolution would use this coupling to allow creatures
to communicate their conscious states to one another. This would allow them to coordinate their behaviour better
than communications that are influenced only by the microdynamics of their physical substrates, since in these models
their behaviour may be directly affected by their conscious states. Models in which consciousness acts causally, via
laws involving its complex physical correlates, also seem to offer some scope for explaining the correlation of pleasure
(pain) with evolutionary (dis)advantage. A pain is something a conscious mind attempts to avoid, arguably by
definition, and if the dynamics of conscious states reflect this, then evolution could naturally exploit this dynamics
if disadvantageous physical situations created physical (brain) states that involved subsystems associated (via the
hypothesized laws) with avoidant conscious states.
Even if these arguments can be made convincing, it would still seem a surprising and fortunate coincidence that,
somewhere in the evolutionary chain, and perhaps very early, life took a material form that had proto-consciousness,
and that matter and consciousness were associated in such a way that evolution was able to make use of the dynamical
rules that give consciousness causal effect (via its material correlates) on matter. A priori, one might imagine that, if
there are simple laws of psychophysical parallelism and simple associated dynamical laws, they need have nothing to
do with self-replicating chemicals or organic information processing systems. So it is fair to ask how much fine-tuning
interactionist panprotopsychist theories could explain, and how much they would still leave unexplained. Still, a partial
explanation is better than none, and we also need to be clear whether we could possibly hope for a fuller explanation
given our present conceptual frameworks. After all, we are conscious. Anyone who finds conceivability arguments
[14, 15] persuasive has to accept this, and all the features of our consciousnesses, as marvellous yet contingent features
of our universe. On this view, we might hope that relatively simple laws characterise our consciousness and explain
its evolution, but we can’t hope for an argument that the laws must take the form they do.
Closer analysis of all these arguments would undoubtedly be valuable. It would also be interesting to develop more
sophisticated toy models, in which we can see rudimentary creatures evolving in a simple environment via modified
dynamics.
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